This paper develops and tests a theory of insurers' choice of the mix of equity and liabilities. The role of equity in insurance markets (and in our model) is to back insurers' promises to pay claims when there is aggregate uncertainty, or dependence among risks. Depending on the nature of this aggregate uncertainty, the equity held by rms in a competitive insurance market may increase with rising uncertainty, or it may initially increase then decrease. The ratio of equity to revenue unambiguously increases with uncertainty. We test the model, as well as implications of recent models of insurance market dynamics, on a cross-section of U.S. property-liability insurers.
Introduction
In the simplest economic models of insurance markets, which ignore transactions costs of any kind, risks are priced at actuarially fair values. This prediction is supported by either of two sets of assumptions: the pooling theory of insurance assumes that insured risks are independently distributed and large in number; the transfer theory of insurance assumes that risks are independent of aggregate wealth in the economy and can be transferred through the issuance of equity to a perfect capital market (Marshall (1976) ). Recent research in insurance economics has shown that the observed dynamics of insurance premiums and contracts can be explained only by a failure of both sets of assumptions. Aggregate uncertainty, and imperfections in the capital market transfer of risks to security holders, are required (e.g., Grn (1994) , Winter (1988 Winter ( ,1994 ). This connection is not surprising, since imperfections of some sort are necessary to explain even the existence of insurance intermediaries. The empirical tests in this recent literature have focussed on time series implications of insurance pricing and capital ows.
This paper explores in more depth the cross-sectional variation in insurers' capital structures: the choice by stock insurers of the mix of equity and liability. As in the standard theory of optimal capital structure for nancial corporations, predictions of the theory must rely on speci c capital market imperfections. We focus here on the simplest one: that issuing and maintaining additional equity is costly. Our model yields testable implications with a focus (appropriate for an analysis of insurance markets) on the liability side of the market. On the empirical side, this paper uses for the rst time, to our knowledge, a sample of 1155 U.S. property-liability stock insurance companies in a study of capital structure.
Section 2 of this paper develops the simplest model of an insurance market with costly equity, in a two-period setting. For equity to have any role in an insurance market there must be aggregate uncertainty, or dependence among insured risks; the absence of a law of large numbers means that equity is necessary to back up promises to pay claims in the event of adverse realizations of aggregate shocks. Accordingly, the key comparative static issue that we focus on is the impact of increasing aggregate uncertainty. We consider separately the cases of aggregate uncertainty in the loss incurred conditional upon an accident and uncertainty in the probability of an accident (i.e. dependence among the events of individual accidents). If the former case, the total equity issued by a competitive insurance market is increasing in the degree of uncertainty (and linear in a parameterized example). In the latter case, equity may be increasing then decreasing as a function of uncertainty. In both cases, the ratio of equity to revenue is increasing in uncertainty.
Section 3 tests the theory using cross-sectional data on U.S. property-liability insurers. While the theory is developed for competitive markets, by assuming that each insurer is operating in one or more competitive markets, we can use rm-level data in the tests. The focus is on tests of two hypotheses. The rst is the implication of the static model developed in section 2, that leverage is decreasing in aggregate uncertainty. The second is an implication of previous dynamic models of competitive insurance markets (Grn (1994) and Winter (1994) ) that external equity is more costly than internal equity { speci cally that there is a positive cost to the \round-trip" of distributing an amount of cash then raising the same amount in external equity. Previous tests of this implication focus on insurance pricing, that the error in premiums as predictors of subsequent claims rather than being white noise should be correlated with the current stock of equity. These tests thus center on the dynamic behavior of insurance premiums. The empirical analysis here is complementary, based not on prices but directly on capital structure decisions. The paper also o ers a link between the recent insurance market literature and corresponding empirical results in tests of capital structure for non-nancial corporations: Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1994) nd negative relationships between leverage and past pro tability; an explicit dynamic theory and tests are o ered by Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989).
The Optimal Capital Structure of Insurers
We describe the capital structure choice of an insurance rm in the simplest possible model. As stated in the introduction, a key assumption must be that risks are dependent, i.e. subject to aggregate uncertainty or common factors. We consider separately the cases of dependence in the events of accidents and dependence in the size of losses incurred.
Uncertainty in Accident Losses

Assumptions
We consider a competitive market for insurance. On the demand side of the market, a large number of individuals each face with a known probability p the loss of wealth. The size of the loss is itself random, taking on the value H with probability and L with probability (1 ? ). If the risks faced by individuals were independently distributed then { given a large number of individuals { insurance would be provided at a fair premium with no need for equity. The optimal capital structure would have zero equity. 1 We introduce a role for equity by assuming that the random losses faced are dependent among individuals. In fact, for simplicity, losses are identical for those experiencing an accident. In short, each individual faces a two-stage lottery, with \accident -no accident" in the rst stage and \L or H" in the second; across individuals the rst stage outcomes are independently distributed and the second-stage outcomes are identical.
The individuals are expected utility maximizers and the gain from exchange in the insurance market arises because they are risk averse. We take the simple case of identical individuals, with initial wealth W and utility U.
Ex ante, a large number of stock insurers issue equity and then issue insurance policies. An insurance policy is assumed to be non-participating. That is, the contract with any individual speci es a payment that is contingent only on the individual's loss experience: I L dollars if the individual experiences a loss of L, I H dollars with a loss of H. The premium is denoted by P: We will constrain the insurance contracts and equity to satisfy a limited liability constraint, so that the contracts promised by the insurer must be credibly backed by the equity issued. We denote by E the equity per policy issued. A second constraint is that the promised payment in any accident state cannot exceed the accident loss in that state; this can be justi ed by a moral hazard assumption that an individual has the ability to cause an accident intentionally.
In a perfect capital market, the opportunity cost of issuing and maintaining equity would be zero; equityholders would be indi erent between investing through the insurance corporation and investing through their personal portfolios. It is evident that in reality equity cannot be issued by an insurer and maintained without limit at zero opportunity cost. The costs include agency costs of having corporate management intermediate between investment in assets and shareholders; the administrative costs of issuing equity; the signalling costs of issuing equity and the double-taxation of corporate income. 2 We do not identify these costs, but simply assume that equity cannot be raised at zero cost. We assume speci cally that to raise E dollars of internal equity, an insurer must issue (1 + c)E in shares, where cE represent these costs of equity.
Equityholders price equity according to the expected value of net payments that they are to receive; this re ects an assumption that the uncertainty in losses, while not diversi able in the insurance market, is diversi able in the stock market. Interest rates are zero. The supply of insurance is taken to be competitive, which means that any capital structure E and policy (P; I L ; I H ) consistent with zero expected return to equityholders will be supplied if it is demanded. On the demand side, the individuals choose the most preferred policy among policies o ered by the market.
This model yields, as an equilibrium, the choice of an insurance policy that maximizes the expected utility of the individual among all the policies yielding zero expected return to stockholders. The issue of concern is how the equilibrium values of equity and the structure of liabilities vary with uncertainty in losses.
Remarks
This is the simplest model within which we can address the impact of dependence in risks and costly equity capital structure decisions. Several features of the simple model abstract from reality. First, we have taken the form of the insurance contract, the nonparticipating contract, as exogenous. This can be justi ed formally with an assumption that an individual can verify only his own accident experience. It includes the simpli cation that no mutual insurance is available. Second, in this static model we do not capture any distinction between the costs of maintaining equity, and the costs of adjusting equity. The evidence from the recent literature is that this distinction is important for explaining the dynamics of pricing and capital ows. This model represents a rst step in analysing the tradeo s between the costs and bene ts of increased equity. In the empirical section, we shall in fact o er some evidence of the cost advantage of internal capital { and, implicitly, of the value of extending this model to a dynamic context.
Equilibrium
Consider rst the payo s to equityholders and individual demanders of insurance, under the contract E; P; I L ; I H ] when this contract is o ered to all individuals. 3 The payo s to an individual who does not experience an accident is W ? P. The payo to an individual who experiences an accident with loss X, for X = L or H is W ? P ? X + I X . The payo to equityholders in the event that accident losses are X is ?(1+c)E+P ?pX since a proportion p of individuals experience an accident.
The contract o ered in a competitive insurance market will maximize expected utility subject to three constraints. The rst is a limited liability constraint, that the payment to accident victims in each event X must not exceed the sum of internal equity, E + P. That is, pI X E + P. The second is a participation constraint for insurers, that the expected pro t be non-negative: ?(1 + c)E + P ? p H + (1 ? The lemma allows us to simplify the contract speci cation and payo s: A contract can without loss of generality now be described as a pair (P; E): Our interest is in the impact on the equilibrium contract of an increase in aggregate uncertainty.
We represent an increase in uncertainty as a mean preserving spread in the conditional distribution of losses, but take as a simplifying restriction that remains constant in this increase. That is, dH > 0 with dL = ? =(1 ? ) dH . Totally di erentiating (2:3) The alternative structure is one in which common factors are in the events of accidents.
We assume now that the loss from an accident is known, and equal to L, but, because of dependence in the events of accidents, the frequency of accidents is random. This frequency, p, is assumed to take on two possible values, a and b, with b > a. The term now represents the probability of the frequency b of accidents. The ex ante probability of an accident for any individual is p = (1 ? )a + b.
A contract now involves the promise of a payment I in the event of an individual accident in exchange for the premium P. In contrast to the case of uncertain losses that are identical across individuals, where contractual promises for cash ows are always met, we must introduce here the notion of bankruptcy. An insurer with equity-per-contract E is bankrupt if P + E ? pI < 0. We allow for the possibility that bankruptcy involves the loss of speci c assets, interpreted as a reputation for prudence, or other bankruptcy costs. As before, issuing equity requires a transaction cost of c per unit.
As before, we consider the contract o ered by a competitive market to identical, riskaverse consumers. This is the contract that maximizes individual expected utility subject to a zero-pro t constraint.
Depending on the market parameters, especially the size of bankruptcy costs and , the equilibrium may or may not involve bankruptcy in the event that the accident frequency is b. In the case where bankruptcy costs are su ciently large, the equilibrium contract in this model will satisfy the solvency constraint in both states. We consider this a reasonable approximation, in light of the regulatory solvency constraints faced by rms. These constraints do not, evidently, reduce the probability of bankruptcy to zero; but the rate of bankruptcy is very small with less than one percent of policies defaulted on in any year. In understanding the costs and bene ts in the choice of an equity ratio by a rm facing existing solvency regulation, and generating testable implications regarding this choice, approximating the regulation as a complete constraint against bankruptcy is useful. 6 When the rm is subject to a no-bankruptcy condition for both events, a and b, the gross return to shareholders in the event b is zero, since (it is easily shown) excess equity will not be issued. The expected return to shareholders from the policy (P; I) with equity E is ?(1 + c)E + (1 ? ) E + P ? aI] = ?(c + )E + (1 ? )(P ? aI) ( 
2.5)
The amount of equity, E, will be chosen given the contract (P; I) to meet minimally the no-bankruptcy constraint in event b: E + P bI or E = bI ? P.
We can solve the no-bankruptcy constraint for I and use this to express the payo s to both shareholders and policyholders as functions of E and P, i.e from the contract that results from P and the e cient use of E. This is convenient for empirical testing, since equity and revenue for insurers are observable, whereas the average coverage per policy is not a meaningful concept. Solving E = bI ? P for I and substituting into (2.5) yields (b ? p)P ? (bc + p)E = 0 where p = (1 ? )a + b is the ex ante probability of an accident.
The optimal contract incorporating the no-bankruptcy constraint, and the zero-pro t constraint solves the following problem: < 0. Solving (2.7) for P, substituting into (2.6) and di erentiating yields the following rst-order condition for (2.6).
? (1 ? Part (c) of the proposition follows from total di erentiation of the right hand side of (2.11).
At the heart of the comparative statics in proposition 3 are two o -setting e ects of an increase in uncertainty on equity. Holding constant the amount of coverage issued, I, an increase uncertainty b implies an increase in the value of equity, E, that is necessary to cover the claims at a given premium. This is the input e ect. The amount of coverage will drop, however, as a consequence of the higher cost of o ering any amount of coverage; this feeds back to a decrease in E: an output e ect. When uncertainty is su ciently low, the input e ect dominates and when uncertainty is high, the output e ect may dominate. The two e ects can be seen in the total di erentiation of the no-bankruptcy condition, which yields dE=db = I + b(dI=db) ? dP=db. The rst two terms of this are, respectively, the input e ect and the output e ect. Endogenizing the change in P through total di erentiation of (2. Cross-sectional data on a sample of U.S. property-liability insurers allows us in this section to provide evidence on two aspects of insurers' capital structure decisions. The rst is the implication from our model that insurers' leverage should be decreasing in the uncertainty faced in predicting average risks. While the equilibrium equity in our model is for particular cases non-monotonic in uncertainty, leverage { as measured by the ratio of insurance revenue to equity { is unambiguously decreasing in uncertainty. The second aspect of capital structure that we o er evidence on is the relative costs of internal and external equity. Recent theory on the economic dynamics of insurance markets relies on the assumption that internal capital is less costly than external equity. By a cost advantage to internal capital, we mean simply that there is a positive cost to the round-trip of distributing an amount of cash to equityholders, then raising the same amount through the issuance of new equity. (The basis for such a cost is well-developed in the literature, e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984) ). Up to now, this assumption has been tested for insurance markets using the time series of insurance market pricing. The implication of this assumption for the cross-section is that leverage should be decreasing in recent pro tability, since this pro tability leads to greater accumulation of internal equity. 7 
Empirical Proxies and Estimation
The rm speci c data are collected from both OneSource and Best's Aggregates and Averages annual reports on consolidated property-casualty insurance companies. These statutory nancial information are led by insurance companies to National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to assist insurance commissioners in regulating and monitoring insurance companies licensed in their respective state. The selected sample covers 1155 propertycasualty stock insurance companies, from 1990 to 1995. To our knowledge, it is the rst time that cross-sectional data on a sample of 1155 U.S. property-liability stock insurance companies is used to study the capital structure of insurers.
The cross-sectional regressions of rm capital structure (leverage) on four hypothesized determinants| uncertainty of insurance loss, claim-paying ability rating, rm size, and past pro tability, are speci ed as log(NPW=E) = + log(SD) + RATING + log(SIZE) + PROFIT + " t (3.1) where NPW is the Net Premiums Written, E is the Policyholders Surplus, SD is the uncertainty of the insurance loss, SIZE is the rm size, PROFIT is past pro tability, RATING is the insurance claim-paying ability rated by Standard & Poor's . These empirical proxies are de ned as follows.
Policyholders' Surplus E: the equity of a property-casualty insurance rm. Net Premium Written NPW: the total insurance policy revenue issued at a given business year.
Loss Ratio: the ratio of incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses to net premium earned.
Capital Structure (NPW=E): is measured as the ratio of Net Premium Written (NPW) to Policyholders' Surplus (E) in 1995. This re ects the relationship between the current volume of net insurance liability and the equity.
Uncertainty of the insurance loss SD: is represented by the standard deviation of the loss ratio from 1990 to 1994. The theoretical model predicts an inverse relationship between the capital structure and the uncertainty in insurance market.
Insurance Rating RATING: the default risk of the insurer a ects negatively the demand for insurance policies. As a proxy for default risk we employ Standard & Poor's Insurance Company Ratings for property-casualty rms. A Standard & Poor's insurance claims-paying ability rating is an assessment of an operating insurance company's nancial capacity to meet the obligations of its insurance policies in accordance with their terms. We assign a value of seven for companies with a rating of AAA, six for AA, ve for A, four for BBB, three for BB, two for B, and one for CCC. We assign a value of zero for those rms with no rating.
Firm Size SIZE: the costly external equity suggests that it is more di cult for smaller rms to issue equity in time of increasing of aggregate uncertainty and big catastrophe event; therefore, smaller insurance rms tend to keep a higher equity-liability ratio. Warner (1977) , Ang, Chua, and McConnel (1982) and Titman and Wessels (1988) provide evidence for non-nancial rms that capital structure is related to rm size. One explanation for this is that transaction costs are decreasing in the size of the rm. Smith (1977) nds that small rms incur substantially more costs to issue equity than large rms. 8 In regression, the natural logarithm of total admitted assets is used as a proxy for rm size. The predicted sign in the regression is positive.
Past Pro tability PROFIT: A positive cost of issuing equity, or a positive cost of distributing cash to shareholders implies a negative relationship between the capital structure and past pro tability. This is because this positive cost of equity implies that the internally generated funds are low-cost source of equtiy capital for the insurance rm. The sample average of the pro t/surplus ratios from 1990 to 1994 is used as a proxy of rm's past pro tability. Table I reports descriptive statistics for variables in the regressions. Table II reports the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions of rm capital structure on four hypothesized determinants| uncertainty of insurance loss, rm size, past pro tability, and rating on claimpaying ability. The regression are conducted on a subsample of 200 largest rms (ranked by admitted assets ) and a whole sample of 1155 rms. In the regression, the t-statistics are calculated using the method of White (1980). The regression results reported in Table  II provide strong evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a inverse relationship between the capital structure and insurance uncertainty. The estimated coe cient for RATING provides further evidence on the relationship between capital structure and insurance uncertainty. It suggests that the capital structure is negatively related to rm's rating, i.e. default risk. The parameter estimate for is ?0:101, with a t -statistic of ?3:506 for the sample of 1155 rms (regression (8)). 8 The transaction costs of issuing securities are de ned as otation costs and costs encountered in trying to secure the highest price for the rm's securities. Smith (1977) identi ed otation costs as: (1) compensation paid to investment bankers, (2) legal fees, (3) accounting fees, (4) engineering fees, (5) trustee's fee, (6) listing fees, (7) printing and engraving fees, (9) federal revenue stamps, and (10) state taxes. Smith went on to provide evidence which showed that rms enjoy economies of scale when issuing securities.
Empirical Results
The parameter estimate for rm size SIZE,^ , is 0:071 with t -statistic of 3:821 in the sample of 1155 rms (regression (8) ). This "size" e ect could re ect higher transaction costs faced by smaller rms in issuing equity. Consequently, the "size" e ect is not signi cant in the sample of the largest two hundred insurance rms.
The estimated coe cients for PROFIT imply that the capital structure is negatively related to rms' past pro tability. The estimated coe cient of PROFIT , b , is negative and statistically signi cant across 1155 insurance rms. The parameter estimate for is {.0497, with a t -statistic of {2.0. The evidence on costly external equity in this cross-section study is consistent with the evidence on the dynamics of insurance markets, in which the explanations of \cycles" in the insurance markets rely on costly external capital.
In general, the restricted and unrestricted regressions con rm that insurers' leverage should be decreasing in the uncertainty faced in predicting average risks. However, insurance uncertainty is not the sole determinant of the capital structure of insurance rms. A combination of SD, PROFIT, SIZE, RATING provides higher explanatory powers. For the sample of 200 rms, the Likelihood Ratio test statistic is 8.192 (between regression (1) and (4)); for the sample of 1155 rms, it is 35 (between regression (5) and (8)), which are all signi cant at 1% level. These results parallel the results of Titman and Wessels (1988) on non nancial rms. 
Conclusion
This paper explores the capital structure of insurers. The focus is on the impact of aggregate uncertainty, or dependence among risks, since this is the source of an insurer's incentive to issue equity. Insurance rms respond to the shocks of increased risks by taking all or some of the following actions: placing limits on the number or coverage of contracts that they o er; raising premium for the policies that they issue; and raising more equity. We analyze the equilibrium mixture of these responses in a competitive insurance market, and nd that the impact of increasing uncertainty on the equity decision depends on the nature of aggregate uncertainty. Where this uncertainty is in the size of losses, equity increases with uncertainty; where the risk dependence is in the events of losses, equity rst increases then decreases with uncertainty, providing that individuals are not too risk averse. The latter result follows from a tradeo between two e ects, which we label the input e ect of uncertainty, and the output e ect. In both cases, however, the ratio of equity to insurance revenue increases.
The paper tests this prediction and others on insurers' capital structure decisions. The cross{sectional tests over major property{casualty rms support the predicted negative relationship between capital structure and insurance uncertainty. The tests also nd that past pro tability and rm size (transaction costs) are an important determinants of the capital structure of insurers. Collectively, the importance of pro tability and transaction costs provides cross{sectional evidence for \capacity{constrained hypothesis" of Grn (1994) and Winter (1994) . Table I Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of capital structure and its determinants. NPW is the Net Premium Written for each rm, E is the Policyholders' Surplus for each rm, the capital structure is measured as the ratio of Net Premium Written (NPW) to Policyholders' Surplus (E). SD is the standard deviation of Loss Ratio over the period from 1990 to 1994. RATING is the Standard and Poor's insurance rating on claim-paying ability (from 0 to 7). PROFIT is the average of pro t/surplus ratios from 1990 to 1994. This table reports the results for cross-sectional regression of liability-to-equity ratio on its determinants: uncertainty of insurance loss, rating, rm size, and past pro tability log(NPW=E) = + log(SD) + RATING + log(SIZE) + PROFIT + " t where NPW is the New Premiums Written, E is the Policyholders Surplus, SD is the insurance loss uncertainty, SIZE is the rm size, and PROFIT is the past pro tability. RATING is the Standard & Poor's rating for property-casualty insurance companies. N is the number of rms in the sample. t-statistics of parameter estimates are reported in parentheses, it is calculated by the method of White (1980) .
